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A BUSINESS ENTITY BY ANY OTHER
NAME: CORPORATION,
COMMUNITY AND KINSHIP
Christian G. Vazquez*
“Congress finds and declares that (a) there is an immediate need for fair and
just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on
aboriginal land claims; (b) the settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with
certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives,
without litigation, with maximum participation affecting their rights and
property.”
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203 § 2(a)–(b),
85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h
(2012))
“Forty years ago, Natives in Alaska were told they needed to learn politics . . .
. So we did. Thirty years ago they were told to learn business, so we have.
John Christensen, former Vice President for the Chenega Bay Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) Council

ABSTRACT
Forty-five years ago, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act resolved
outstanding land claims between the federal and state government and Alaska
Natives. The fund created by the settlement was used as seed money to establish
the Alaska Native Corporations. The Native corporations have particular
features which make them distinct from other business entities, these
differences have been lauded by some shareholders but have simultaneously
drawn ire from others. In 2015 the Alaska legislature introduced H.B. 49, a
benefit corporation bill that would allow entrepreneurs to pursue both profits
and social ends. This note traces the rise of the modern Alaska Native
Corporation. It then weighs the merits of each business entity and assesses
which is best aligned to improve the lives of Alaska Natives.

INTRODUCTION
Long known for its pioneering spirit, the state of Alaska continued
to build on this tradition when it settled land claims with Alaska Natives
in a manner unlike any other settlement between a state and indigenous
peoples—by using the corporate form. In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims
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Settlement Act (ANCSA) 1 resulted in the formation of the Alaska Native
Corporations (ANCs). Ultimately, thirteen regional corporations and over
200 village corporations were created 2 with the seed money derived from
a one billion dollar settlement with the federal and state governments.
Almost forty-five years since the settlement, these entities have
undergone numerous readjustments, but, at their core, they strive to
improve the lives of Alaska Natives. Since 2010, another corporate entity
with a mission not limited to maximizing shareholder profits has come
into vogue in the United States—the benefit corporation (also known as a
“B Corp”) with an emphasis on social and environmental goals. 3
Essentially, the B Corp is a distinct entity choice that allows for-profit
corporations to function in a middle zone between the non-profit and
traditional business model by requiring socially responsible goals in its
mission, rather than solely a commitment to profit maximization. 4 In
2015, the Alaska House of Representatives introduced a B Corp statute
titled “House Bill 49” (H.B. 49) 5 which would have introduced a corporate
form that might have been more attractive than ANCs.
Corporations are powerful entities—they aggregate capital, talent
and labor toward a common goal. Historically, corporations accomplish
their goal by making profits for shareholders; this Note will analyze the
effects on the corporate form and accountability when goals other than
profits are favored. Additionally, this Note will analyze how the
experience of ANCs can serve as a reference point for the future of B
Corps and vice-versa. Part I will trace the history of the ANCSA
settlement, the structure of ANCs as business entities, and attendant legal
considerations. Part II will trace the rise of the B Corps, comparing the
merits of ANCs and B Corps. This Note will ultimately conclude that both

Copyright © 2016 by Christian Vazquez
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017; B.A., History, Yale
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advise a Note about business associations slightly out of his usual domain, and to
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like a family for this South Floridian.
1. ANCSA, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)).
2. Id. §§ 1606–1607.
3. See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007 (2013) (detailing the model legislation for
Benefit Corporations and governance issues posed by this particular corporate
form).
4. Id. at 1009.
5. H.R. 49, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015).
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corporate forms are distinct enough that ANCs should be kept as different
entities to serve very narrow goals for their sociocultural constituency.

I.

THE ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS

“The Native people themselves are often under a misapprehension regarding
the land—they think that it is their land, when it is in fact corporate land.
If you own stock in General Motors, you can’t walk in there and drive off in
one of their cars. . . . What it is that our corporation owns the land. Sure, we
elect the board of directors. I sit on the board of directors myself. However, there
is [sic] certain things that you have to follow in a profitable corporation, and a
lot of those rules of the game don’t allow you to get involved into the social,
political aspects of the Native people that the Native peoples so much expect
from a corporation.”
Don Standifer, Tyonek Native Corporation 6
“It’s like you and I never saw a baseball game in our lives. We’d never seen
mitts or bats or baseballs. All of a sudden you were told, ‘Here’s your mitts.
Here’s your bats. Here’s your balls. Tomorrow, you play the Yankees.’”
John Hope, a Tlingit and Juneau resident involved in land claims,
describing the struggle to fill the business expertise gaps that
developed in the years following the ANCSA settlement 7

The formation of Alaska Native corporations (ANCs) has been
widely lauded for its innovative approach to settling native claims. Rather
than relying on the widely criticized reservation system used elsewhere
to deal with the property claims of native peoples, Alaska Natives sought
a different solution, through the corporate form. 8 However, ANCs have
also been criticized for the disconnect between incorporation on the one
hand and concepts of Native sovereignty and cultural traditions rooted in
subsistence and kinship on the other. 9 ANCs are distinctive from other
6. THOMAS BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE
REVIEW COMMISSION, 29–30 (1st ed. 1985).
7. Cathy Brown, Lori Thomson & Svend Holst, Between Worlds: The History,
ALASKA
HUMANITIES
FORUM
(last
visited
Sept.
23,
2016),
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modern-alaska/between-worlds-the-history.
In 1998, the Juneau Empire staff, in collaboration with the Kenai Peninsula Clarion
and Alaska Journal of Commerce traveled throughout the state of Alaska to
prepare a special report detailing the impact of ANCSA on Alaska Natives. Id.
8. See Svend Holst, Between Worlds: Political Clout, ALASKA HUMANITIES
FORUM (last visited Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modernalaska/between-worlds-political-clout (noting in a special report the increase in
political and economic influence Native corporations have given Alaska Natives).
9. See generally Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act:
Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L. J. 1331 (1992) (exploring the
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corporations in the manner that they were established—they were created
by legislation and mandated by statute. 10 In this way, ANCs are a reversal
of the traditional process of incorporation wherein a group finds an
economic opportunity and organizes itself to exploit and capitalize on
that opportunity. 11 ANCs are again peculiar because a source other than
their owners provided capital. 12 Moreover, ANCs, unlike most
corporations, did not begin with a business plan or product; instead they
were funded first and then urged to create or find economic opportunities
afterward. 13
Additionally, the shareholders and management of ANCs are unlike
those of most other large corporations. Native shareholders are connected
by ties of kinship, culture, and affinity with the very land that the
corporations have put into trust. 14 ANC corporate management is also
distinct. Directors are not required to declare dividends to keep and
attract shareholders, and shareholders were assigned by an act of
Congress. 15 Shares were not tradable for the first twenty years after issue,
and regional corporations are required to share revenue with one
another. 16 All of these differences present both opportunities and
obstacles to the core mission of ANCs—improving the lives of Alaska
Natives.
A.

Native Claims, Sovereignty, and Settlement

Before ANCSA’s enactment, the legal status and property claims of
Alaska Natives were unsettled. Although Article III of the 1867 Treaty of
Cession between Russia and the United States provided that Alaska
Natives be treated in the same manner as other Native American tribes,

manner in which the corporate form contemplated by ANCSA failed the Alaska
Natives in maintaining sovereignty and presenting alternatives). Hirschfield’s
note was written only twenty years after the settlement and much has changed
since then. In particular, the economic viability of the business entities has taken
a turn for the better. See Mara Kimmel, Fate Control and Human Rights: The Policies
and Practices of Local Governance in America’s Arctic, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 179, 180
(2014) (noting the adverse impact that losing territorial control over the land
conveyed in ANCSA had on Alaskan tribal governance).
10. ANCSA, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)) (establishing Alaska Native corporations and the
manner in which they are organized).
11. BERGER, supra note 6, at 28.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 29.
16. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i).
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this obligation was rarely observed. 17 The treaty was further complicated
by the fact that Article VI declared Alaska Natives:
to be free and unencumbered by any reservations, privileges,
franchises, grants or possessions, by any associated companies,
whether corporate or incorporate, Russian, or any other, or by
private parties, except merely private individual property
holders. 18
The federal Organic Act of 1884 further complicated the treaty’s
vagueness regarding the treatment of Alaska Natives because it failed to
render a definitive stance on the status of lands claimed by Alaska
Natives. 19 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Article VI of the treaty
to have extinguished communal Native land claims and § 8 of the Organic
Act to have recognized Indian title to a relatively small number of land
plots. 20 In 1955, the Supreme Court disapproved of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning, holding that Native claims were aboriginal, rather than
constitutionally compensable property interests. 21
Alaska’s admittance to statehood on January 3, 1959 22 began the
chain of events that eventually led to the enactment of ANCSA and the
formation of ANCs. Pursuant to section 4 of the Statehood Act, the state
was required to “forever disclaim all right and title to any lands or other
property . . ., the right or title to which may be held by any Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts.” 23 Furthermore, section 4 reserved “absolute
jurisdiction and control” of such property to the federal government until
Congress disposed of it. 24 Section 6 of the Statehood Act also allowed the
state to select approximately 103 million acres from the “vacant,
unappropriated, and unreserved” public lands held by the federal
government. 25 In October of 1959, the Tlingit and Haida Tribes obtained
a judgment from the United States Court of Claims concluding that they

17. Treaty concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North
America, Russ.-U.S., Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, 542.
18. Id. at 542–43.
19. See An Act Providing a Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat.
24, 26 (1884). The Organic Act extended federal laws over mining claims to Alaska
as well as the first framework for territorial and civil government after the U.S.
acquisition from Russia. Id. From 1867 to 1884, Alaska had been governed as a
federal military district. See generally DAVID CASE & DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA
NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS chs. 1–2 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CASE & VOLUCK].
20. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 1947).
21. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278–79 (1955).
22. Alaska Statehood Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339.
23. Id. at 339.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 340 (explaining the state’s power to select public lands).
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held aboriginal title to most of southeast Alaska and were entitled to just
compensation 26—a watershed moment for Alaska Natives.
The Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States 27 decision served as an
impetus for the founding of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) in
1966. 28 At its first convention, AFN recommended that the Department of
the Interior freeze all federal land conveyances pending settlement
because an increasing number of non-Natives had begun purchasing
Alaskan land following statehood. 29 Alaska Natives politically organized
and protested the notion that lands would be conveyed without their own
claims being heard first. 30 As a result, the Department, under the
leadership of Secretary Stewart Udall, stopped the conveyance of all lands
from the federal government to address Native claims. 31 In Alaska v.
Udall, 32 the state sued to compel the Secretary of the Interior to resume
the conveyance of land. 33 At the district court level, the state succeeded
on a summary judgment claim, but lost the subsequent appeal asking for
the freeze to be terminated when the Native Village of Nenana intervened
as a defendant and established that there were genuine material issues as
to whether the lands selected were truly “vacant, unappropriated and
unreserved” as required by the Alaska Statehood Act. This pressed the
need to settle claims to the land by the Natives. 34 These events coincided
with the discovery of oil at the Prudhoe Bay oil field on the North Slope
and the subsequent desire to construct an 800 mile pipeline to extract
these reserves. 35 Congress introduced legislation resolving the Native
claims to avert prolonged litigation and commence pipeline
development. 36

26. Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 315, 342 (1959). In
1935, both Native groups had been authorized by Congressional Act to pursue
aboriginal title claims in the U.S. Court of Claims for compensation owed prior to
federal land withdrawals of their aboriginal claims. Act of June 19, 1935, Pub. L.
No. 49-388, § 2, 49 Stat. 388, 388.
27. Id.
28. History: AFN Founded in 1966, ALASKA FED’N OF NATIVES (last visited Sept.
23, 2016), http://www.nativefederation.org/about-afn/history/.
29. BERGER, supra note 6, at 23.
30. R.D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 94–103 (1978).
31. Id. at 102.
32. 420 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 939–40.
34. Id.’’
35. See generally Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and
Unfinished Business, 43 TULSA L. REV. 17, 31 (2007) (reviewing the beneficial nexus
of ANCSA to potential exploitation of oil and gas in the Prudhoe Bay region).
36. Id.
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ANCSA and the Structure of Native Corporations

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was enacted on December
18, 1971. 37 ANCSA mandated the conveyance of almost forty-four million
acres of land and the cash payment of $962.5 million (about three dollars
per acre) in exchange for the extinguishment of aboriginal land claims. 38
The federal government contributed $462.5 million and the state of Alaska
contributed $500 million to the Alaska Native Fund which disbursed
settlement payment. 39 ANSCA conveyed 10 percent of Alaska’s territory
to the natives, while the federal government retained 60 percent and the
state of Alaska kept the outstanding 30 percent. 40
The settlement also created two tiers of the aforementioned ANCs:
regional and village corporations. 41 The first tier includes the twelve
larger, regional corporations formed with the intent to group Natives
“having a common heritage and sharing common interests.” 42 A
thirteenth regional corporation was also established for non-resident
Alaska Natives. 43 The regional corporations were required to incorporate
as for-profit entities under the laws of Alaska, and every Native enrolled
in that region was issued 100 shares of stock after enrolling. 44 The second
tier includes the village corporations, in which only Natives in eligible
villages could enroll for stock. 45 Importantly, while village corporations
were only allowed to hold title to the surface of the land, regional
corporations were entitled to both surface and subsurface rights. 46
ANCSA § 7 requires 70 percent of “all revenues received” by each
regional corporation from “timber resources and subsurface estate
patented to it” to be divided annually among all twelve of the land-

37. ANCSA, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)).
38. § 1605.
39. Id.
40. BERGER, supra note 6, at 24.
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606–1607.
42. Id. § 1606(a).
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(c).
44. Id. § 1606(d), (g).
45. Id. § 1607(a). Generally, Alaska Natives received 100 shares from their
regional corporations and 100 shares from one of the over 200 village
corporations. BERGER, supra note 6, at 24.
Natives associated with a region who did not reside in an eligible village received
only regional stock. Id.
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a). This has resulted in litigation between the regional and
village corporations. However, this was ultimately resolved through the court’s
holding that anything that might be considered part of the mineral estate is
subsurface and therefore belongs to the regional corporations. See Koniag, Inc. v.
Koncor, 39 F.3d 991, 998–99 (9th Cir. 1994).
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owning regional corporations. 47 Subsequently, ANSCA § 7(k) requires 50
percent of this revenue to be apportioned to the village corporations. 48
Moreover, the stocks in ANCs were made inalienable for twenty
years. 49 Natives born after the settlement was enacted were not granted
shares under the Act—although some ANCs have allowed for
disbursements to those born after the alienability period expired in 1991
through amendments to their own corporate bylaws. 50
Fifteen years after ANCSA’s enactment, the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs concluded that few of the statute’s intended
goals had been attained, particularly those regarding improvement in
living standards for Alaska Natives. 51 The regional corporations were
marginally better off than the village corporations, although a few were
still facing bankruptcy. 52 Many of the problems with ANCSA were rooted
in the exorbitant implementation costs. 53 Natives were given capital but
then told to establish more than 200 business entities, select forty-million
acres of land, and coordinate business activities where there had
previously been none. 54 The daunting task presented to ANCs was
described by then-President of the Alaska Federation of Natives Janie
Leask in a 1984 submission to the President’s Commission on Indian
Reservation Economies:
What has fallen on Native people and their institutions during
the past thirteen years is a legal and administrative burden so
overwhelming that in many ways implementing ANCSA has
become an end itself . . . . The entire effort has drawn off tens of
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i).
48. See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. (Aleut IV), 484 F. Supp. 482,
487 (D. Alaska 1980) (noting that the purpose of 7(i) revenue sharing is to even
out the resource wealth of the Alaska Native regions by redistributing timber and
mineral revenues).
49. ANCSA, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688, 692 (1971) (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1) (2012)).
50. Id. § 1604(a). Those born after 1971 have been referred to sardonically as
the “after-borns.” The manner in which the settlement failed to account for the
children and grandchildren of Natives has been a point of contention and deeply
divisive. Thomas R. Berger, Judge, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Speech at
United Tribes of Alaska Convention (Oct. 1985), available at
http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/vlgjour.htm. See BERGER, supra note 6,
at 31–32 (discussing the manner in which this has strained kinship ties within
ANCs); CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 237 (2005) (noting the new inequity created by a system that devised
shares to Alaska Natives at a specific date to settle land claims).
51. H.R. REP. NO. 100-31, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 27, 1987) at 3.
52. See id. at 4–5 (finding the village corporations “failed to meet the economic
social and cultural needs of the Alaska Native.”).
53. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 19, at 179.
54. Id.
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millions of dollars which more properly could have been put
into business investments, human-resource development,
communications between stockholders and corporate leaders,
and training and technical assistance for village corporation
personnel . . . . If the implementation costs were heavy for
regions it was worse for the villages, especially the small ones,
because they had so little cash from the Alaska Native Fund to
begin with. We now have villages which are almost broke from
going through the steps of incorporation, corporate election,
enrollments, stock issuances, land conveyances, CPA audits,
meetings, decisions, public reporting, ect. [sic], etc., etc. They
haven’t made much money or really engaged in much economic
development activity. But they have implemented ANCSA. And
many of them have now come to a point where they have to sell
some of their land in order to keep going. 55
In response to these deficiencies and obstacles, Congress passed a
series of amendments to ANCSA that included indefinite tax exemptions
and protection from creditors on lands that were not developed as well as
the continuance of the restriction on the sale of ANCSA stock. 56 Other
amendments enabled shareholders to decide whether to admit children
born after 1971. 57 Every two years, Congress has continued to relieve
ANCs of many obligations that normally accompany corporate activities
such as reporting requirements, transfer restrictions, and other board
responsibilities. 58 These modifications, coupled with overcoming the
growing pains of mastering the corporate form, can be credited with
ANCs’ subsequent ascent as an economic force in Alaska. 59 ANC annual
revenues account for about a quarter of Alaska’s gross domestic

55. H.R. REP. NO. 100-31, at 4.
56. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-241, ch. 11, § 907, 101 Stat. 1788, 1806–07 (1988) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 1636 (2012)) [hereinafter 1987 Amendments]. Though titled the
“Amendments of 1987,” enactment occurred on February 3, 1988. CASE & VOLUCK,
supra note 19, at 185 n.113. Moreover, they are popularly referred to as the “1991
Amendments” because of the provisions changing the original 1991 deadline on
inalienability of the shares in ANCs. Id.
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1636.
58. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 19, at 180.
59. Tim Bradner, Native corporations doing well, for now, but problems still loom,
ALASKA
JOURNAL
OF
COMMERCE
(Oct.
13,
2011,
8:47
AM),
http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2011-10-13/native-corporationsdoing-well-now-problems-still-loom#.Vx0l-ZMrJE4. In 2010, eight of the ten
highest grossing Alaskan-owned businesses were Native corporations; four had
revenues greater than $1 billion. Id.
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product. 60 Following a short dip in fiscal year 2013, corporate revenues
have rebounded—the economic viability of ANCs is strong. 61 Specifically,
in 2014, revenue performance increased just 1 percent from 2013 across all
the regional corporations. 62 Although revenue remained relatively
stagnant, profitability in 2014 increased by 98 percent from 2013. 63
C.

ANCSA, Accountability, and Promoting the Good of Alaska
Natives

ANCSA’s primary purpose was to settle Native claims, but its
innovative secondary purpose is closely tied to the corporate form: the
rapid assimilation of Alaska Natives into the American free market
economy. 64 Douglas Jones’ 65 testimony at the March 1, 1984 Alaska Native
Review Commission Round Table discussions in Anchorage noted that:
[The] mechanisms that we chose, of how the land was allotted
and the money provided were really rooted, themselves, in what
I think we were trying to accomplish in a social engineering
way . . . [W]e were trying to accomplish some things socially. We
were trying to accomplish some things individually. That is, for
individual Natives and not just collectively, and that’s why we
had a mix of things that had to do with individuals and things
that had to do with collectivism. . . . So there’s a whole lot of
things, devices, that were crafted in that act that I think . . . could
60. Gerad Godfrey, My Turn: Native corps. more important than ever, JUNEAU
EMPIRE (Dec. 16, 2015, 1:03 AM), http://juneauempire.com/opinion/2015-1216/my-turn-native-corps-more-important-ever. Mr. Godfrey is Governor Bill
Walker’s senior advisor on rural business and intergovernmental affairs. Id.
61. Tim Bradner, Native regional corporations net income rebounded in 2014,
JOURNAL
OF
COMMERCE
(Dec.
2,
2015,
2:11
PM),
ALASKA
http://www.alaskajournal.com/2015-12-02/native-regional-corporations-netincome-rebounded-2014#.Vx0mypMrJE4. In 2014, total revenue for the
corporations was $8.57 billion compared with $8.49 billion in 2013.
Comparatively, the annual combined revenue of the regional corporations in 2001
stood at $2.1 billion. Tim Bradner, Native corporations prove their mettle, ALASKA
JOURNAL
OF
COMMERCE
(Apr.
7,
2001,
8:00
PM),
http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2001-04-08/native-corporationsprove-their-mettle#.Vx0qcJMrJE4.
62. ANCSA REGIONAL ASSOCIATION, 2014 ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, 9 (2014)
http://ancsaregional.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ANCSA_economicreport.pdf [hereinafter 2014 ANCSA IMPACT REPORT].
63. Id.
64. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 19, at 188.
65. Douglas Jones was a member of the Federal Field Committee which laid
the groundwork for ANSCA. ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION, ANCSA
Institutions and Legal Regimes, vol. IV at 293 (Mar. 1, 1984) (transcript available in
the University of Alaska Fairbanks Rasmuson Library). He later served as Senator
Mike Gravel’s assistant. Id.
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fairly be described as pointed toward a social individual and
attitudinal changes. Now, I’m thinking [that] the private
corporation matter and the financial experiences matter have to
do with attitudinal changes that we were hoping to accomplish,
maybe even some cultural ones. 66
As a result, the corporate form became the vehicle by which Alaska
Natives were given a form of control over their lands and, ultimately,
economic life. Thus, it is worth assessing the following features of ANCs:
(1) the restrictions on stocks; (2) the particular manner in which ANCs are
regulated and managed; (3) the corporate structure; and (4) the benefits
that they confer on shareholders.
1.

Stock Restrictions: Alienability and Transfer

An initial concern facing Alaska Natives was the alienability of ANC
stock. 67 Alaska Natives feared ANCs might fall into the hands of nonNatives. 68 This issue was resolved with the 1987 Amendments, which
extended the initial two-decade resale restrictions on all shares
indefinitely until a majority of all outstanding shareholders votes to
eliminate them. 69 Only one ANC put the option to remove the stock
restrictions to a shareholder vote, which narrowly rejected the option. 70
The 1987Amendments thus preserved ANCs as special corporate entities
that do not simply allow individual shareholders to sell stock outside the
Native population, but rather require the community to act collectively to
allow such sales. 71
Transfer to subsequent generations was a related concern due to the
limited seed money from the single settlement. ANCSA’s drafters had
only contemplated the issuance of stock to Natives born before the
settlement. 72 Those born after December 18, 1971 were left without
stock—straining filial relations of some Alaska Natives. 73 The 1987
Amendments resolved this problem by adding a provision allowing
Native shareholders to issue stock to children born after the settlement if

66. Id. at 363 (statement of Douglas Jones).
67. See id. at 360 (testimony from Douglas Jones noting that ANCs were
structured with inalienable stock in order to prevent Native assets from ultimately
“fall[ing] into non-Native hands” if the stock corporations were sold).
68. Id.
69. 1987 Amendments, sec. 5, § 7(h), 101 Stat. 1788, 1792–93 (1988).
70. Eve Rose, Vote Keeps CIRI Stock Native-Held, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar.
7, 1998, at A-1.
71. 1987 Amendments, § 5 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)).
72. Id. § 4 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)).
73. Id.

33.2 NOTE - VAZQUEZ (DO NOT DELETE)

364

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/12/2016 7:18 PM

Vol. 33:2

ANCs decided to do so through amendments to their bylaws and
subsequent resolutions. 74
2.

Securities Laws and Regulation of ANCs

ANCSA’s 1976 and subsequent 1987 amendments exempt ANCs
from federal securities laws provided they do not issue unrestricted stock,
terminate the restriction on the stock, or file a registration statement with
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 75 Exemption from federal
securities laws is particularly advantageous to ANCs due to the high cost
of compliance with SEC disclosure obligations. 76 Moreover, due to the
composition of ANC shareholders, such disclosure is less crucial to
protect the unaware investor. 77 Although ANCs are exempt from SEC
disclosures, ANCs must still report “substantially all the information”
included in an SEC registrant’s annual report to shareholders. 78 Another
shareholder safeguard required ANCs to conduct annual audits in
accordance with generally accepted standards and that the audits be
“transmitted to each shareholder.” 79 Because ANCs provide the SEC with
“substantially all the information” required in annual registration forms,
this information differs from that required in an SEC registrant’s annual
report under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is likely less
burdensome. 80 A 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report
74. Id. At least eleven of the Native corporations have approved the issuance
of stock to the children of the original shareholders. See Alex DeMarban, After
Calista vote, descendant dilemma looms for Alaska Native corporations, ALASKA
DISPATCH NEWS (July 19, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/20150719/aftercalista-vote-descendant-dilemma-looms-alaska-native-corporations (noting that
this issue is one that the regional corporations are moving forward with very
cautiously).
75. Act of Jan 2, 1976, sec. 3, § 28, 89 Stat. 1145, 1147 (amending ANCSA to
exempt all ANCSA corporations from the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940
until the end of 1991). These were likely the earliest amendments by Congress that
made the regulatory burden on ANCs less cumbersome. See 1987 Amendments,
sec. 14, § 28, 101 Stat. at 1811 (amending the 1976 exemptions). The 1987
Amendments extended the exemption from the federal securities laws beyond
1991 so long as the corporations continued the restrictions on shares. Id.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 94-729, 19 (1975).
77. See id. at 20 (noting that federal regulation of the Native corporations was
not necessary to protect the Native shareholders or the public during the time
period in which stock in ANCs could not be sold).
78. 1987 Amendments, sec. 14, § 28(a)(c)(1), 101 Stat. at 1811.
79. Id. See Id. sec. 12(a), § 7(o), 101 Stat. at 1810 (striking the requirement that
ANCs’ audited financial statements be transmitted to the Secretary of the Interior
and the Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs).
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-121, REGIONAL ALASKA
NATIVE CORPORATIONS: STATUS 40 YEARS AFTER ESTABLISHMENT, AND FUTURE
CONSIDERATIONS, 34 (2012) [hereinafter GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE
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on the regional corporations collaborated with the SEC in assessing the
content of the 2010 annual reports. 81 In the GAO report, SEC staff noted
that ANCs’ annual Management Discussion and Analysis disclosures
(MD&A) did not fully explain material uncertainties that might
reasonably affect future trends and prospects in the shares as would be
required of other registrants. 82 Additionally, because ANCs are required
to produce annual shareholder reports containing “substantially all the
information” found in a regular SEC registration, the SEC staff faced
uncertainty as to which accounting standards and disclosures the
corporations should follow. 83
Although ANCs are exempt from most federal reporting
requirements, they must comply with other state regulations. 84 Following
Congress’s approval of exemption from federal securities laws, the State
of Alaska enacted what might be called the “Alaska mini-securities
statutes.” These laws only apply to ANCs with 500 or more shareholders
and $1 million or more in assets. 85 ANCs must disclose information about
the performance of the board of directors and the company as well as
information related to the solicitation of proxies or propositions before
shareholders at annual shareholders’ meetings. 86 Alaska also requires
ANCs to submit biennial reports containing information about the
current board of directors, the number of shares issued, and other related
information. 87 Failure to comply with the biennial reporting or biennial
corporation tax allows the state to involuntarily dissolve the
corporation. 88 If the State determines a violation has occurred, it may
authorize administrative action. 89 Data from 1978 to 2011 indicates the
CORPORATIONS]. Specifically, Rule 14a-3(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act establishes
requirements for information included in annual reports to shareholders
accompanying an SEC registrant’s proxy solicitation. Id. at 31 n.51. This form is
less detailed than the annual report known as Form 10-K that SEC registrants
must file. Id.
81. Id. at 32–37.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id.
84. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.138–.139 (2012).
85. Id.
86. Id. §§ 08.305–.365 (2012).
87. Id. §§ 10.06.960(i), (k) (2012).
88. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 11.
Alaska has never dissolved a regional corporation involuntarily. Id. n.24.
However, in 2010 the thirteenth regional corporation—the designated corporation
for those not living in Alaska at the time of the settlement—was put on notice of
potential involuntary dissolution. Id. Several village corporations have been
involuntarily dissolved by the state. Id. It should be noted that exploring
preemption conflicts in the state’s dissolution of federally mandated corporations,
while possible, is a subject for another article.
89. Id. at 35–36. Administrative orders have been delivered in the case of the
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State issued at least twenty-nine administrative actions against various
regional corporations. 90 Violators may be ordered to cease the violation,
to file future proxy solicitations before distribution to shareholders for a
time period, and to pay fines. 91 The courts have also enforced traditional
common law duties of care and loyalty on corporate directors and
officers. 92
The 2012 GAO Report noted that, although the State has the
authority to review all proxy solicitations, it primarily reviews only those
for which a corporation or shareholder has filed a complaint. 93 The State
does not investigate whether ANCs are in compliance with the threshold
requirements for proxy statements, but instead relies on these complaint
and self-reporting mechanisms. 94
3.

Board Membership and Structure of the Corporations

Membership in a regional corporation board is subject to two major
requirements: directors must be over the age of eighteen and must be a
shareholder of the corporation. 95 All ANCs elect directors by cumulative
shareholder voting. 96 However, notwithstanding these basic
requirements, the corporations may establish their own bylaws. 97
Consequently, board sizes range from nine to twenty-three members. 98
The State requires regional corporations to include information for board
candidates in their proxy solicitations for director elections including
following violations: failure to file proxy materials meeting filing requirements,
failure to include required information in proxy solicitations which could make
statements materially false or misleading, and the inclusion of materially false and
misleading information. Id.
90. Id. Six of the investigations resulting in administrative orders involved a
regional corporation’s board solicitation. Id. Twenty-two were related to
shareholder solicitations. Id. One involved a village corporation’s failure to
comply with state proxy requirements by placing advertisements in a local
newspaper requesting that the shareholders vote for two candidates seeking
election to a regional corporation’s board. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp., 250 P.3d 531, 532–33 (Alaska
2011) (affirming liability of a director and officer found to have breached their
duties of loyalty and care and imposing a five-year sanction on service on the
board of directors); Brown v. Ward, 593 P.2d 247, 251 (Alaska 1979) (invalidating
false and misleading proxy solicitation forms).
93. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 35.
94. Id. Although self-regulation may provide autonomy, it is also a product of
necessity. See id. (noting that State officials have indicated they do not lack the
resources to routinely review proxy filings for compliance).
95. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(f).
96. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 74, at 25.
97. See id. at 17 (showing the variation of corporate policies and bylaws).
98. Id. at 17.
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their name, age, address, all positions and offices presently held with the
ANC, and business experience within the past five years. 99 Director terms
are three years and staggered so that generally one-third of the positions
are up for election each year. 100 Five regional corporations require board
representation from specifically delineated regions within the greater
area from which they draw shareholders to better represent the interests
of all Alaska Native groups. 101
ANCs are generally given more discretion to manage themselves
than other corporations. This accounts for their substantial exemption
from federal regulation and the manner in which they largely selfregulate in accordance with Alaska’s securities laws. This is so because,
unlike other corporations, the shares in ANCs are nontransferable, tying
ownership to a community with goals that transcend profit maximization.
Overall, the primary purpose of ANCs is to raise the standard of living
for Alaska Natives.
4.

ANCs, Conferring Benefits and the Greater Good of the Native
Community

Beyond its mission of bringing Alaska Natives into the mainstream
commercial world, ANCSA also allows ANCs to provide a wide variety
of benefits to shareholders. 102 Unlike traditional corporations, ANCs are
not focused on boosting share prices or raising dividends. 103 To be sure,
all ANCs confer dividends to enrolled Alaska Natives. However, ANCs
also supply shareholders with other nonconventional benefits such as
scholarships, funeral benefits, charitable and in-kind donations,
employment opportunities, cultural preservation, land management,
opportunities for economic development and advocacy. 104 All ANC
shareholders hold the same class of stock and receive the same dividends
99. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 08.345(b)(1)(A), (B), (F) (2016).
100. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 22.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., id. at 38, 40–48 (describing benefits authorized by ANCSA,
including those which “promote the health, education, or welfare of shareholders
and other Alaska Natives”).
103. See id. at 38 (discussing the professed intent of regional corporations to
“provide economic, cultural, social, or all three types of benefits” to shareholders).
104. See id. at 39 tbl.6, 40–48 (noting that regional corporation dividend
payments in 2010 ranged from $2.35 per share to $64.26 per share, but that
dividends declared in any year represent only a snapshot for the current year); see
also Morgan X’atkeen Howard, Dividends do not define success for Alaska Native
Corporations,
ALASKA
DISPATCH
NEWS,
Oct.
23,
2014,
http://www.adn.com/article/20141023/dividends-do-not-define-successalaska-native-corporations (noting that dividends are a poor measure of success
for Native corporations because other benefits better gauge improvements to the
lives of Alaska Natives).
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across the board. These dividends are vital to defraying living expenses
for Alaska Natives and are calculated annually by each regional
corporation. 105
Shareholder benefits occasionally differ within a particular ANC.
For instance, at times, kinship ties have pressured ANCs to benefit
particular Native members. 106 The 1987 Amendments allowed for such
disproportionate benefits to “promote the health, education, and welfare”
of the trust beneficiaries or “preserve the heritage and culture of
Natives.” 107 In effect, this resulted in the distribution of additional funds
apart from the dividend disbursement to those deemed trust
beneficiaries—in many cases Elders. 108
Other monetary benefits, less similar to those found in traditional
corporations, are authorized under ANCSA’s 1998 Amendments—these
are even less restrictive, not necessarily having to be filtered through a
trust beneficiary. 109 These amendments confirmed ANC authority to
provide benefits to promote the health, education or welfare of
shareholders and their family members. 110 The 1998 Amendments are the
basis for the regional corporations’ support of a variety of educational
scholarships for shareholders and their children. 111 ANCs have different
standards for scholarships—some are merit-based, while others fund as
many eligible applicants as possible. 112
A majority of the regional corporations provide assistance for
memorial and funeral benefits for shareholders and their descendants. 113
This assistance is provided either directly or by an affiliated nonprofit
organization. 114 The financial assistance is crucial to preserving Alaska
Native burial traditions by helping offset the costs of family members

105. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 79, at 38–39.
106. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 19, at 197.
107. 1987 Amendments, sec. 10, § 39, 101 Stat. 1788, 1805 (1988).
108. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 19, at 197.
109. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 38 n.63.
110. ANCSA Land Bank Protection Act of 1998, sec. 12, § 7(r), 112 Stat. 3129,
3135 (1998).
111. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 41–42. All
twelve regional corporations provide such scholarships. Id.; Robert O’Harrow, Jr,
Despite questions over ANCs, many pay out millions in dividends, scholarships,
charitable
donations,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
29,
2010,
9:27
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/29/
AR2010092907614.html [hereinafter O’Harrow, Despite questions over ANCs]
(describing regional corporations payouts totaling $35 million in 2008 for
scholarships and charitable donations).
112. See GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, 41–42
tbl.7 (outlining the various scholarship models pursued by ANCs).
113. Id. at 42.
114. Id. at 42 n.67.
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traveling to ceremonies. 115 Generally, the assistance is capped at an
amount ranging from $500 to $3,000 per person or family. 116
ANCs may also make both monetary and in-kind charitable
contributions 117 to nonprofits and other entities that offer services to
Native shareholders. 118 These funds generally support housing
authorities, health organizations, or vocational schools in their respective
regions. 119
In addition to these monetary benefits, regional corporations also
offer nonmonetary benefits through partnerships with village
corporations, tribal organizations, and nonprofits in the region. 120 These
benefits include employment opportunities, cultural preservation, land
management, economic development, and issue advocacy. 121
ANCs may also engage in preferential hiring for shareholders, 122
which may take the form of employment, training, or internships. 123
However, a major criticism of ANCs is that they have failed to supply
enough such jobs. 124
Cultural preservation is actively supported by ANCs by the
establishment and funding of nonprofit organizations or heritage
centers. 125 Several corporations sponsor inter-generational camps that
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id.
117. These in-kind donations include firewood for winter heating or gravel for
village infrastructure from gravel pits owned by the corporations. Id. at 43–44.
118. Id. at 43.
119. Id. One regional corporation provides funding for a flight school to train
private and commercial Native pilots, a useful resource for villages only accessible
by plane. Id.
120. Id. at 44–48.
121. Id.
122. 1987 Amendments, sec. 15, § 29, 101 Stat. at 1812 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. § 1626(g)). To not run afoul of provisions in civil rights laws that prohibit
employment discrimination, the 1987 Amendments exempted the Native
corporations and entities owned by the corporations. Id.; S. REP. NO. 100-201, at 39
(1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3269, 3290–91.
123. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 45. The
employment policy of regional corporations varies substantially. Id. For example,
in one regional corporation, 55% of employees at its zinc-lead mine are
shareholders, and the decision to develop the mine took this condition into
account. Id. Conversely, other corporations did not emphasize the importance of
employment because such opportunities were less attractive to shareholders. Id.
124. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., For many with stake in Alaska native corporations,
promise of better life remains unfulfilled, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2010, 10:53 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/29/
AR2010092906318.html (noting that only 10% of employment opportunities
created by ANCs have benefited Alaska Natives despite billions of dollars in
defense contracting flowing into ANC coffers in the wake of the September 11
attacks).
125. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 46.
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support traditional language education and the preparation of
subsistence foods. 126 Others have helped protect artifacts and sites by
funding preservation. 127
Additionally, by actively managing claimed surface lands, ANCs
provide a service to the Native community that seeks to preserve both
their lifestyle rooted in subsistence and an economically viable future. 128
The sheer size of ANCs and the influence they exert across the state
makes them agents of economic development by coordinating massive
projects that smaller business entities in the region would lack bandwidth
for. 129 Thus, ANCs confer benefits not only on shareholders, but also on
the citizens of Alaska as a whole, with ANCSA corporations in the 2015
Alaska Business Monthly Top 49ers list accounting for 18,542 jobs—69.3%
of Alaska jobs. 130 At times this comes into conflict with the core mission
of ANCs because the majority of ANC employees are not Alaska
Natives. 131
One of the most unique benefits that ANCs confer on shareholders
is the manner in which they serve as advocates for Alaska Natives. 132
Economies of scale permit ANCs to lobby and access legal expertise not
otherwise possible for smaller villages or individual Alaska Natives. 133
Additionally, Executive Order 13,175 134 requires that the heads of federal
agencies consult ANCs on the same basis as Indian tribes. 135 This not only
ensures that interests of Alaska Natives are taken into account in the
policy-making process, but that they are represented by competent legal
experts. 136 All ANCs are also members of the Alaska Federation of
Natives—the largest statewide Native organization. 137 ANCs have most
126. See O’Harrow, Despite questions over ANCs, supra note 111 (detailing
Sitnasuak Corporation’s support for shareholders to attend “fish camps” along
the Bering Sea and pursue subsistence traditions such as catching and drying
salmon).
127. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 47.
128. See id. (describing regional corporations’ use of active management for
subsistence land uses).
129. Id.
130. 2014 ANCSA IMPACT REPORT, supra note 62, at 7.
131. Id.
132. GAO, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, at 48.
133. Id.
134. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000).
135. Id.
136. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-199, § 161, 118
Stat. 452 (2004). As amended, this Act requires the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget and all federal agencies to consult with ANCs on
policies that may have tribal implications. Id.
137. ALASKA
FED’N
OF
NATIVES,
About
AFN,
http://www.nativefederation.org/about-afn/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). The
AFN’s mission includes advocating for Alaska Native people, fostering and
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recently exerted their political muscle in national elections by supporting
particular candidates for the U.S. Senate. 138 Accordingly, many state-wide
candidates now court the Native vote at the annual Alaska Federation of
Natives Convention. 139
Although certainly not perfect, ANCs have managed to aggregate
talent and capital for the Native peoples of Alaska. This has been
accomplished by tailoring the needs of the corporate form towards those
of Alaska Natives over the course of the last forty-five years. The
subsequent entities that have developed from continuous Congressional
adjustments to ANCSA are distinct from comparable corporations, with
such deviations needed to bridge the gap between corporation,
community, and kinship. While they have served as an effective
experiment, however, ANCs are not the only corporate form utilized by
Alaska Natives to address community interests.

II.

BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AND ALASKA HOUSE BILL 49

In the last decade, another corporate form has become quite
popular—the benefit corporation (“B Corp”). 140 The Alaska state
legislature considered, but ultimately failed to pass, House Bill 49 (H.B.
49) to enable business entities in the state to organize themselves as B

encouraging the preservation of Alaska Native cultures, promoting
understanding of Alaska Native’s economic needs, and encouraging development
along the lines of such interests. Id.
138. See Julia O’Malley, Alaska: Where Native groups have corporations - and
political
heft,
AL
JAZEERA
AM.
(Nov.
3,
2014,
10:00
AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/11/3/alaska-wherenativegroupshavecorporationsandpoliticalheft.html (describing efforts by ANCs
to support their chosen senatorial candidates in recent elections).
139. See id. (noting increasing importance of Alaska Natives in election of statewide candidates).
140. Maryland became the first state to pass a B Corp statute in 2010. See MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08 (LexisNexis 2011); see also John Tozzi,
Maryland Passes ‘Benefit Corp.’ Law for Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK.
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.paladinlaw.com/news_detail.php?MarylandPasses-Benefit-Corp.-Law-for-Social-Entrepreneurs-49; B Lab, Maryland First State
in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM),
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Unionto-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation#. Since 2010, thirty-one states have
passed B Corp statutes, including: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, as well
as Washington D.C. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Sept. 23,
2016).
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Corps. 141 In states authorizing the B Corp form, these corporations may
deviate from the profit maximization framework 142 rooted in the concept
of shareholder primacy 143 and instead pursue the public benefit of
society—such as the betterment of the Alaska Native community and the
environment. This Part will analyze whether the B Corp form would be
better for Native corporations in the decades to come. Arguably, a
transition toward B Corps could make ANCs more accountable than the
current entities while still subjecting them to fewer corporate law
obligations than traditional corporations, further bringing the Native
Community into the corporate mainstream.
By transforming ANCs into B Corps, the share alienability
requirements could be removed while still allowing ANCs to pursue the
goals of helping Natives attain higher standards of living. Essential to the
B Corp structure is the ability to keep the corporation accountable to the
beneficial interests that they support. However, this focus on
accountability imposes other limitations that do not outweigh the benefits
of the Native Corporate form created by ANCSA.
A.

House Bill 49: Opportunities Presented by Reorganizing ANCs as
B Corps

H.B. 49 was introduced on January 21, 2015 during the 29th
legislature’s first session. 144 H.B. 49 was quite similar to the Model
Legislation for B Corps. 145 It had the typical requirement for the existence
of a general public benefit. 146 It would have allowed Alaska B Corps to

141. Paul Seaton, Sponsor Statement: HB 49, ALASKA STATE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(Jan.
19,
2015,
11:35
PM),
http://www.housemajority.org/2015/01/19/sponsor-statement-hb-49-2/.
142. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization? 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593–606 (2011) (noting the manner in
which benefit corporations are different from traditional for-profit and nonprofit
entities because of their dual mission of profit and social good).
143. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (imposing a
duty on managers of corporations to maximize shareholder profit).
144. H.R. 49, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015); Katie Moritz, Prefiled bills in plain
English: 23 pieces of legislation introduced Friday, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Jan. 18, 2015, 1:06
AM), http://juneauempire.com/local/2015-01-18/prefiled-bills-plain-english.
145. See Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1007 (describing model legislation for
benefit corporations); see infra note 146.
146. Compare Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.030)
(defining the general public benefit as “a material positive effect on people and
their surroundings, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard”),
with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (B LAB, Draft with Explanatory Comments, Apr.
4, 2016) (defining the general public benefit as “[a] material positive impact on
society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”).
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also pursue specific public benefits such as the provision of products,
services, and educational opportunities to low-income or underserved
individuals, families or communities; the promotion of economic
opportunities beyond job creation in the normal course of business;
improvements to human health; promotion of the arts, sciences or
advancement of knowledge; and increase in the flow of capital to entities
for the benefit of the public. 147 Because such specific purposes would have
been an improper foundation for establishing a B Corp, however, these
benefits could have occurred only as a byproduct of the general purpose
identified. Therefore, the B Corp’s potential to better serve the goals of
Alaska Natives over the current ANC structure would likely have proven
illusory. 148
On the other hand, current federal securities reporting requirements
impose limits on ANCs. ANC shares must be non-tradeable to remain
exempt from federal securities reporting requirements. Re-organized as B
Corps, ANCs could continue to provide the same benefits while being
held more accountable to the interests of Alaska Natives by requiring
annual reporting. These heightened reporting obligations would
ameliorate the major criticism aimed at ANCs—that they fail to achieve
the intended goals of improving the lives of Alaska Natives. 149
B.

The Limits of the B Corp Form: Accountability for Increased
Costs and Compliance

The B Corp structure also carries several limitations. The first major
drawback is the process through which a corporation can be certified as a
B Corp. Like in the model legislation, H.B. 49 would have allowed an
existing corporation to convert by amending its articles of incorporation
to contain a statement that it is a benefit corporation. 150 However, B Corps
147. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.040(d)(1)–(6)).
These six activities are analogous to the six activities listed in the model
legislation. Id.; MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (defining “public benefits”). A
seventh catch-all provision for specific purposes is also listed in both H.B. 49 and
the model legislation. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §
10.60.040(d)(7)); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102.
148. See Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1015 (noting that B Corp statute rigidity
does not allow corporations to solely pursue specific benefits if they wish to do
so).
149. See Michael Grabell, Rampant fraud, self-dealing alleged in Alaska Native
corporation, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.adn.com/article/rampantfraud-self-dealing-alleged-alaska-native-corporation (discussing investigation
revealing that profits from government projects attained through 8(a) contracting
have gone to outside contractors and Washington lobbyists rather than Native
shareholders).
150. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.010(2)).
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are generally certified by a third party known as “B Lab”, which makes
assessments and provides corporations with necessary certifications. 151
Hence, an ANC choosing to convert would have needed to rely on a third
party likely ill-informed of the particular issues facing Alaska Natives.
The reliance on the third party would remove the semi-autonomy that
ANCs have given Alaska Natives over their own affairs since the ANCSA
settlement.
A second major limitation of B Corps is their overhead costs. While
possible for larger companies like Ben & Jerry’s and Patagonia, it is
unlikely that smaller companies can internalize the costs necessary to a
successful transition to a B Corp structure. The imposition of corporate
requirements when ANCs were formed already hindered them in the
initial years after the settlement and would likely do so once again by
reintroducing administrative stress just as they have begun to get their
feet off the ground and thrive. 152 The requirement to appoint a benefit
director 153
would only prove more cumbersome on the Native
corporations that have recovered since the 1980s because of the relatively
lax reporting regime with which they must comply.
The biennial benefit report required of B Corps might have been
welcomed by Native shareholders looking to make ANCs more
accountable for benefits other than the dividends. H.B. 49, similar to other
state legislation, would have required B Corps to file such a report with
the state outlining how it pursued public benefits and the relative success
of those initiatives. 154 The biennial reports would have been assessed by
an independent third-party standard. 155 The costs of such a report would
likely have proven too high for regional corporations and would certainly
be prohibitive for village corporations. 156 While the transparency benefits
of such reports are arguably worth the costs, it begs the question of
whether a sufficient number of shareholders would actually have
consulted the reports. 157 Difficulties with quantifying less tangible
benefits like employment training and cultural opportunities threaten to
151. B
Lab,
About
Certified
B
Corps,
CERTIFIED
B
CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
152. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 30 (describing the administrative burden of
implementing ANCSA, which left villages almost broke).
153. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 304(b)(1)–(2) (defining the functions of a
benefit officer as having “the powers and duties relating to the purpose of the
corporation to create general public benefit or specific public benefit provided”
and “the duty to prepare the benefit report required by section 401”).
154. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.500–501). See also
Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1015 (explaining general requirements of a Benefit
Report in model legislation and its effects).
155. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.501(2)).
156. Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1016.
157. Id.
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render the reports altogether useless. 158 Third-parties generating these
reports, such as B Lab, would likely lack the cultural insights and
understanding of Alaska Natives’ interests necessary to draw meaningful
conclusions. 159 As a result, the B Corp form could have forced directors to
rely upon metrics with faulty methodology to make their determinations
to the detriment of the true interests most important to the Native
community. Many of these interests, especially those that are not easily
quantifiable such as the provision of particular vocational training in
certain villages would suffer as a result. 160 Ultimately, reorganizing as B
Corps might have increased the accountability of ANCs but would have
simultaneously hamstrung them in other respects.
The B Corp model legislation’s third party audit requirement might
arguably resolve the difficulties of measuring the benefits provided by B
Corps. However, H.B. 49 § 10.60.530 would not have required the benefit
report assessment to be audited or certified by an independent party. 161
Rather, H.B. 49 required only that the annual report be assessed against a
third-party standard and not by an independent auditor. 162
Independent benefit directors, which would have been imposed
upon B Corps by statute, could have created another regulatory burden
for ANCs in two respects. 163 First, it could have resulted in an oversized
influence of one individual over the benefits conferred to shareholders of
the regional corporations that include different Native peoples and
villages. Second, this requirement could have added another layer of
bureaucracy and complexity to ANCs that have thrived with the
increasingly simplified corporate form.
The potential oversized influence of a single individual could also
have posed the risk of politicizing the election of directors because the
director might be seen as having an undue influence over the type and
recipient of particular benefits. Independence could also have proven
difficult to accomplish for ANCs because, unless the benefit director were
not a Native shareholder in the corporation, such autonomy would be

158. Id. at 1018.
159. See id. at 1017–18.
160. See id.; see also Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a
Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 612 (2012) (noting
that B Corp annual reports might result in discouraging “the pursuit of goals that
are less easily quantified or that are not measured at all.”).
161. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.530).
162. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.510(2)). The logic of this provision may
be rooted in the weakness of third-party auditing, and the manner in which
corporations might be able to shop around for desired ratings. See Loewenstein,
supra note 3, at 1019–20 (noting that benefit corporations are likely to game the
auditing system in order to attain more favorable scores).
163. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.150).
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impossible to attain. Moreover, the benefits of independence for such a
director could be undercut by potential lack of insight into the values or
concerns of Native shareholders. Indeed, the current structure of regional
corporations strongly suggests their boards are to have a regional focus.
This was at odds with the independent perspective embraced by the bill.
Furthermore, the requirement to add a benefit director would have
imposed costs on converting corporations. Benefit directors are generally
responsible for preparing a compliance statement for the annual benefit
report to shareholders. 164 This statement requires the benefit director to
provide an opinion on whether the B Corp acted in a manner consistent
with its public benefit purpose. 165 Benefit directors also assess whether
the other directors and officers complied with their duties to take into
account the effects of their actions on shareholders, employees, and other
constituencies. 166 Additionally, the benefit director is required to report
any observed failures of the corporation and its directors and officers to
act according to the public benefit. 167 Because ANCs already exhibit close
filial ties, these requirements could have created an incentive to give in to
popular opinion and groupthink. 168 These numerous obligations reveal
that the role delegated to the benefit director is quite burdensome and
possibly unnecessary—it would likely be even more so for ANCs, because
the wide range of specific benefits they provide would all need individual
scrutiny.
Additionally, in attempting to make ANCs more accountable to
shareholders, a move toward a B Corp model might have opened ANCs
to more liability in the form of benefit enforcement proceedings. 169 Under
H.B. 49, a claim could have been brought by shareholders when the
corporation, board, or officers failed to create the general or specific
benefit set out in its articles of incorporation or violated one of the duties
or obligations delineated in the bill. 170 The benefit enforcement
proceedings could have remedied many of the complaints that ANCs are
not doing enough for Alaska Natives—but at what cost?
This added liability would have limited the current substantial
discretion granted to ANC directors and officers the decision-making
164. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.180).
165. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.180(1)).
166. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.180(2)). The duties of directors of a B
Corp are outlined in § 10.60.100, while the duties of B Corp officers are outlined
in § 10.60.230. Id.
167. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.180(3)).
168. See Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1024–25 (questioning the potential for the
professionalization of benefit directors who would be retained and compensated
for rendering favorable opinions).
169. Id. at 1020–21.
170. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.300).
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process. 171 Unlike other B Corp statutes, H.B. 49 would have limited B
Corps from any monetary damages in the case of an enforcement
proceeding. 172 As a result, the enforcement proceeding would have given
shareholders the means to override the authority of the board. 173 A highly
contentious enforcement proceeding could have thus caused great harm
to any corporation, but it could have been even more destructive to the
sociocultural ties underlying ANCs. Furthermore, the open-ended text
which allowed liability for “failure to pursue or create general public
benefit or a specific public benefit” would surely have scared off any
prospective directors or officers. 174 ANCs have strived to train and
enhance the skills of their corporate leadership. Internecine turmoil,
however, instigated by a small number of disgruntled shareholders
dissatisfied with, for example, the allocation of a training program in one
village over another could have deleterious effects. Such a specter could
set back the progress of the last forty-five years.
The existence of the constituency provision in H.B. 49 could have
also further complicated the decision-making process for ANC boards of
directors. 175 The constituency provision could have possibly liberated
Native corporations to expand benefits conferred on non-shareholder
Natives under § 10.60.100(1)(D) as “community and societal factors,”
which seems a catch-all term. But it could also have undermined the
primary group ANCSA was made to serve. By placing shareholders in a
grouping with six other constituencies who are to be considered by the
Board in making decisions, H.B 49 could have allowed the core needs of
Alaska Natives to be ignored. Additionally, the constituency provision
listed so many different constituencies that any interest could be used to
rationalize the choices made by the board. 176 Should Alaska enact a B
Corp statute, the shift could be tantalizing for ANCs. But the model may
simply prove more burdensome than the benefits reaped.

171. Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1021.
172. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.310).
173. Id.
174. Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1020–22 (noting that if a benefit corporation
includes a specific public purpose to alleviate poverty in its community, it would
be liable if poverty persisted).
175. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.100(1)). This
provision requires the Board of Directors to consider effects of action and inaction
on several interests: shareholders; employees; customers; community and societal
factors; local and global health; the short term and long-term interest of the B
Corp; and the ability of the B Corp to accomplish general and specific public
benefit purposes. Id.
176. Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 1027.
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CONCLUSION
H.B. 49 was a great attempt to free entrepreneurs with a socialminded focus to pursue such ends. H.B. 49 was quite thorough, and, like
much of Alaska’s legal tradition, has had the chance to capitalize on
developments in the lower forty-eight. This resulted in draft legislation
that accounted for issues that have arisen since Maryland enacted the first
B Corp statute in 2010. Moreover, the B Corp model could have presented
Alaska Natives with the chance to make ANCs more accountable and to
further shareholder control in benefit decision-making.
The corporate form that has evolved from Congress’ repeated
tweaks to ANCSA and the substantial autonomy given to ANCs is a
continuing work in progress. ANCs are not perfect, but they have been
receptive to the needs of Alaska Natives and will better maintain the
balance of corporation, culture, and kinship inherent to those needs than
a B Corps structure could. ANCs will likely continue to serve those
interests as a new generation of Alaska Natives take the helm. While H.B.
49 failed to pass, Natives might have the option to choose a new corporate
form if Alaska becomes the thirty-first jurisdiction to enact a B Corp
statute in a later session. Therein lies the beauty of the corporate form—
the opportunity to choose from many options. However, the organic
evolution of ANCs and the particular legacy of the settlement between
Alaska Natives and the government supports the notion that the special
corporate form that has been created by ANCSA will continue to be the
best fit for Alaska Natives.

